Netherlands – Dutch Gambling Authority Starts Enforcement Actions Against Suppliers

The Dutch gambling regulator started challenges against B2B suppliers of operators offering their games to players located in the Netherlands expanding the scope of its regulatory enforcement.

On 2 November 2026, the Kansspelautoriteit (Ksa) published a binding instruction against Endorphina Limited (Malta) and Endorphina Ltd. (Cyprus), after finding that their games were available on websites offering gambling services illegally in the Netherlands.

What happened?

The Ksa found that Endorphina’s games were available on multiple websites targeting Dutch players without the required local gambling licence. Its investigation included checks carried out between January and September 2026. The regulator identified games on 27 unlicensed websites and found that they remained accessible on several websites during checks conducted at the end of September, despite measures previously taken by Endorphina.

The Ksa relied on the following provisions of the Dutch Betting and Gaming Act (Wet op de kansspelen):

• Article 1(1)(a): prohibits offering games of chance in the Netherlands without the required licence.
• Article 1(1)(b): prohibits promoting participation in unlicensed games of chance.
• Article 34n: allows the Ksa to issue a binding instruction to certain intermediaries providing essential components of a remote gambling system.

The full reasoning is available in the Ksa’s binding instruction against Endorphina⁠, published on the regulator’s official website⁠.

Importantly, this measure is a binding instruction, not a fine. The Ksa required the companies to take adequate measures to prevent their games from being available through unlicensed Dutch gambling websites.

Why should gambling suppliers be concerned?

Endorphina argued that it was a B2B supplier and did not directly offer gambling services to Dutch players. It also relied on the distinction between its Maltese and Cypriot entities, their separate distribution arrangements and the possibility that third parties had made its games available without authorisation. The Ksa was not persuaded that these arguments were sufficient to avoid the instruction.

The decision raises several issues for suppliers:

• Being a B2B provider is not necessarily a complete defence. A supplier may still be subject to regulatory intervention where it provides components that are essential to remote gambling services.
• Separate group entities may not provide sufficient protection. The Ksa considered that both companies could take measures to address the issue, notwithstanding their separate corporate structures and distribution arrangements.
• Third-party misuse needs to be addressed. It may not be enough to argue that games have been distributed without the supplier’s knowledge or authorisation. Suppliers should be able to demonstrate that they have investigated and acted on potential misuse.
• Intent may not be decisive. The Ksa indicated that awareness or intent was not necessary for the purposes of issuing this type of binding instruction.

This does not mean that every B2B supplier automatically becomes responsible for the conduct of every operator or intermediary using its products. However, it does mean that suppliers should carefully assess their ability to control distribution and respond to unauthorised use.

You can read an article on how also Italian law extended its scope to hit suppliers “Foreign gambling companies risk the Italian corporate criminal liability“.

What should operators and suppliers do now?

Both operators and suppliers should review their existing arrangements. For gambling suppliers:

1. Review distribution agreements and ensure that they expressly prohibit the supply of games to unauthorised operators and markets.
2. Maintain effective technical controls, including geolocation restrictions and the ability to block access where necessary.
3. Monitor where games are made available, including through distributors and other intermediaries.
4. Establish clear escalation procedures when games are identified on unlicensed websites.
5. Document investigations, decisions and remedial measures so that they can be demonstrated to regulators.
6. Assess whether group companies have the contractual and technical ability to take action, rather than relying solely on their separate corporate status.

For gambling operators:

1. Check that all games and other gambling content are sourced through properly authorised distribution channels.
2. Ensure that suppliers and aggregators have effective controls to prevent unauthorised distribution.
3. Include appropriate regulatory cooperation, audit and suspension rights in supplier agreements.
4. Review procedures for responding when content is identified on websites or in jurisdictions where it should not be available.

These measures should also be considered alongside the wider technology and cybersecurity obligations affecting the gambling industry. For example, see my article on NIS 2 obligations for gambling operators and suppliers⁠ and the analysis of the Cyber Resilience Act for gambling operators and suppliers⁠.

These issues deserve attention beyond the Netherlands. The broader Dutch enforcement environment is also relevant: see the DLA Piper analysis of gambling litigation in the Netherlands⁠.

Our DLA Piper colleagues in the Netherlands can assist gambling operators and suppliers in assessing the implications of the Ksa’s approach, reviewing existing distribution arrangements and identifying the measures needed to manage regulatory exposure in the Dutch market. This is also an opportunity to compare the Dutch position with the regulatory expectations emerging in other European jurisdictions. You can read about the different gambling regimes in almost 50 jurisdictions in the DLA Piper Gambling Laws of the World guide.